La sentencia A, B y C contra Irlanda y la cuestión del aborto: ¿Un “punto de inflexión” en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos en materia de consenso y margen de apreciación nacional?

This article analyzes the case of A, B and C v. Ireland in which the plaintiffs claimed that the Irish laws on abortion are incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The article deals specifically with the parts of the ruling handed down by the European Court of Human Rights that cover the role of European consensus in the establishment of the margin of appreciation that is given to states in the restriction of rights recognized by the Convention. The article argues that this ruling is a “new departure” in the case-law of the Strasbourg Court and points out some of the negative consequences that this entails, from a perspective that is critical of the Court’s reasoning.This article analyzes the case of A, B and C v. Ireland in which the plaintiffs claimed that the Irish laws on abortion are incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The article deals specifically with the parts of the ruling handed down by the European Court of Human Rights that cover the role of European consensus in the establishment of the margin of appreciation that is given to states in the restriction of rights recognized by the Convention. The article argues that this ruling is a “new departure” in the case-law of the Strasbourg Court and points out some of the negative consequences that this entails, from a perspective that is critical of the Court’s reasoning.En el presente artículo se analiza el asunto A, B y C vs. Irlanda, en el que las demandantes denunciaron la incompatibilidad de la regulación del aborto en derecho irlandés con el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Se abordarán específicamente aquellas partes de la sentencia dictada por la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos relacionadas con el rol del consenso europeo en la determinación del margen de apreciación que se concede a los Estados en el marco de la restricción de los derechos reconocidos por el Convenio. La tesis que se defenderá es que esta sentencia supone un “punto de inflexión” en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Estrasburgo, apuntando algunas de las consecuencias negativas que ello entraña, desde una perspectiva crítica de las consideraciones que guían el razonamiento del Tribunal